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There’s no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political 
consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make 
them near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your 
bathtub. 
  —Associate Justice Otto Kaus 
  Supreme Court of California1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Hey, what the f are you doing? She’s unconscious.”2 Two international 
graduate students had just discovered nineteen-year-old Brock Turner thrusting 
toward a young woman with her genitals exposed, behind a dumpster at Stanford 
University in January 2015.3 The half-naked victim was not moving.4 Turner 
ran.5 The graduate students managed to knock Turner onto the ground and waited 
for the police to arrive.6 Turner was charged with two counts of rape, two counts 
of penetration, and one count of assault with intent to commit rape.7 While the 
two rape charges were later dropped,8 a jury convicted Turner of the remaining 
charges.9 Probation officers formally recommended a “moderate county jail 
sentence, formal probation, and sexual offender treatment.”10 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2018; B.A. 
Political Science and B.A. Legal Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2014. I thank Associate Dean and 
Professor Mary-Beth Moylan for her wisdom, guidance, and confidence since first-year Civil Procedure. 
Without her, my “Global Lawyering Skills” would not exist. I also thank Distinguished Professor of Law 
Michael Vitiello for inspiring me to write on judicial recall and framing this Comment on the Brock Turner 
case. I also thank Rosemary Deck for her editing prowess and my family and friends for their unwavering love 
and support. Lastly, I thank Kendall Fisher for being my best friend and for bringing so much joy and happiness 
into my life.  
1. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 61 (Princeton University Press ed., 2006). 
2. Scott Herhold, Thanking Two Stanford Students Who Subdued Campus Sex Assault Suspect,  MERCURY 
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/03/21/herhold-thanking-two-stanford-students-





7. Timeline of Significant Dates in the Life of Brock Turner, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 11, 2016), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/962a8de554994637afce94a22afb78e9/timeline-significant-dates-life-brock-turner 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
8. Michael E. Miller, All-American Swimmer Found Guilty of Sexually Assaulting Unconscious Woman 
on Stanford Campus, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/03/31/all-american-swimmer-found-guilty-of-sexually-assaulting-unconscious-woman-on-
stanford-campus/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
9. Id. 
10. Probation Report at 12, People v. Turner, No. B1577162 (2016), available at https://www. 
documentcloud.org/documents/2858997-Probation-officer-s-report-in-Brock-Turner-case.html#document/p1 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Nick Anderson & Susan Svrluga, In Stanford Sexual 
Assault Case, Probation Officer Recommended ‘Moderate’ Jail Term, WASH. POST (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/06/10/probation-officers-report-for-brock-turners-
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On June 2, 2016, Judge Aaron Persky of the Superior Court of California for 
Santa Clara County sentenced Turner to six months confinement in the county 
jail to be followed by three years of probation.11 Judge Persky also ordered 
Turner to register as a sex offender and participate in a sex offender rehabilitation 
program.12 According to Judge Persky, “a prison sentence would have a severe 
impact on [Turner]. I think he will not be a danger to others.”13 
Judge Persky’s sentence sparked national concern for judicial leniency and a 
massive effort to formally recall the judge.14 Some Stanford student groups were 
outraged at the news and held a demonstration during the university’s 
commencement ceremony in 2016.15 Professor Michele L. Dauber at Stanford 
Law School launched a campaign to recall Judge Persky from the state bench.16 
Another petition on Change.org, an online petition platform, has collected more 
than 1,324,000 signatures in support of the recall.17 California, among eight other 
states, allows judicial recall as a method for the public to keep state court judges 
accountable.18 
California’s “unregulated” judicial recall process should end because it 
crosses the threshold of what is necessary to ensure judicial accountability of 
state court judges.19 This Comment compares how state court judges are 
ultimately more accountable than federal judges, which places their judicial 
independence at risk.20 Part II discusses how judges are decision-makers bound 
by the rule of law and should not bend to the political will like elected 
 
sentencing/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
11. Brock Turner Sentenced to Six Months Amid Calls for Tougher Penalty, ESPN NEWS (June 4, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/15938889/brock-turner-former-stanford-cardinal-swimmer-
sentenced-six-months-jail (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12. Id. 
13. Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case Draws Outrage, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-over-dueling-statements-
of-victim-and-attackers-father.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
14. Id. 
15. Liam Stack, Judge Aaron Persky Under Fire for Sentencing in Stanford Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 
7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/judge-in-stanford-rape-case-is-being-threatened-who-is-
aaron-persky.html?action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle 
&pgtype=article (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
16. Id. 
17. Remove Judge Aaron Persky from the Bench for Decision in Brock Turner Rape Case, CHANGE.ORG, 
https://www.change.org/p/california-state-house-impeach-judge-aaron-persky?version=meter+at+0&mo 
dule=meter-Links&pgtype=article&contentId=&mediaId=&referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.co 
m%2F&priority=true&action=click&contentCollection=meter-links-click (last visited Apr. 7, 2017) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
18. See Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., http://www. 
judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/methods/removal_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited Apr. 7, 2017) (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (only Arizona, California, Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin are the states where judges are subject to recall elections). 
19. Infra Parts IV, V, and VI (explaining that other measures of accountability are sufficient to ensure 
judicial accountability, and that unregulated judicial recall in California is dangerous).  
20. Infra Parts IV and V.  
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politicians.21 Part III adopts a brief definition of judicial independence and 
explains its significance.22 Part IV discusses how judicial elections of judges in 
the state courts, including California, continue to serve as a method of judicial 
accountability.23 Part V discusses additional mechanisms of accountability that 
states like California continue to embrace—impeachment, judicial commissions 
on performance, and recall.24 Part VI focuses on California’s “unregulated” 
judicial recall system and its severe consequences on the integrity of California 
courts if recalls are successful.25 Specifically, California’s “unregulated” recall 
process encourages harsher sentencing, increases spending by special interest 
groups, and encourages an uninformed public to engage in judicial decision-
making—making recalls easier, riskier, and more likely to occur in the future.26 
Therefore, California’s “unregulated” recall of judges is redundant to the goal of 
judicial accountability, and ultimately unnecessary in keeping California’s justice 
system accountable.27 
II. JUDGES & THE RULE OF LAW 
Article III of the United States Constitution created a federal judiciary as a 
co-equal branch of government, and “not as a servant of the president or 
Congress.”28 The Framers’ intended creation of a third branch in a separate 
“Article” in the Constitution, to match Article I for Legislative Powers and 
Article II for Executive Powers, shows that the judiciary branch is a separate, co-
equal institution created for the sole purpose of critiquing and invalidating 
government actions from the other branches of government.29  
At a minimum, the separation of powers framework also separates the judges 
from electoral control to “protect the citizen” from oppressive congressional and 
executive actions.30 This constitutional framework set up the hallmark of the 
American judiciary—the ability to abide by the rule of law and resolve disputes 
 
21. Infra Part II. 
22. Infra Part III. 
23. Infra Part IV. 
24. Infra Part V. 
25. Infra Part VI. 
26. Infra Parts VI.A–C. 
27. Infra Parts IV, V, and VI. 
28. Charles H. Franklin, Behavioral Factors Affecting Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 148, 148 (Stephen B. Burbank & 
Barry Friedman eds., 2002).  
29. Id. 
30. See W.F. Rylaarsdam, Judicial Independence – A Value Worth Protecting, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 
1655 (1993) (“The judiciary is the only institution that stands between the citizen and an omnipotent 
government; if the judiciary independence is not upheld, the judiciary cannot effectively protect the citizen”); 
Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 981–82 (2001) (“Judicial 
independence does not protect the judge; it protects the people.”). 
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based on the case law and underlying facts, but nothing else.31 Nothing serves as 
a timelier reminder of the judiciary’s function than Judge James L. Robart’s entry 
of a temporary restraining order of parts of the Trump Administration’s 
Executive Order 13769,32 Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry 
Into the United States, in Washington v. Trump.33 
The judiciary was designed to interpret the laws that the legislature has 
enacted and the executive has enforced.34 The public “expects its judges to 
resolve disputes by reasoning impartially on the basis of legal principles, and 
judges regularly explain their decisions in terms consistent with the public’s 
expectations.”35 Some people posit that the mere use of judicial elections makes 
judges equals of the political branches’ legislators and executives, and thus 
should follow the majority will.36 However, the judge’s only obligations are 
interpreting the enacted laws.37 The majority will cannot influence a judge’s 
actions if it was not formally enacted as law; this would circumvent separation of 
powers and fail to protect minority, fundamental rights.38 As Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said, a judge’s duty is not necessarily to “do justice,” 
but rather his job is to “apply the law” even when it may not be the most “just.”39 
Therefore, judicial politics and functions cannot be equated to legislative 
politics.40 Judges are bound by making decisions based on laws that elected 
representatives enact on behalf of the people.41 When making decisions in 
 
31. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 65 (2003) (“[impartiality] is 
an instrumental value designed to preserve a different end altogether: the rule of law . . . to resolve disputes 
between parties on a case-by-case basis according to the applicable facts and law”). 
32. See generally Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (example of executive power over immigration that was limited by the judicial branch).  
33. As the court wrote in State of Washington, et al. v. Trump, et al.,  
“Fundamental to the work of this court is a vigilant recognition that it is but one of three equal 
branches of our federal government. The work of this court is not to create policy or judge the 
wisdom of any particular policy promoted by the other two branches. That is the work of the 
legislative and executive branches and of the citizens of this country who ultimately exercise 
democratic control over those branches. The work of the Judiciary, and this Court, is limited to 
ensuring that the actions taken by the other two branches comport with our country’s laws, and 
more importantly our Constitution.” 
     No. C17-0141JLR, slip. op. at 6–7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), aff’d, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 
2017) 
34. Franklin, supra note 28.  
35. KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL – EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT 77 (2010). 
36. Kermit L. Hall, Judicial Independence and the Majoritarian Difficulty, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 68 
(Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005). 
37. Id. at 63. 
38. Id. 
39. Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111 (1996).  
40. Frank B. Cross, Law Is Politics, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY 
THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 110 (Charles Gardner Geyh, ed., 2011).  
41. Geyh, supra note 31, at 65 (“[Impartiality] is an instrumental value designed to preserve a different 
end altogether: the rule of law . . . to resolve disputes between parties on a case-by-case basis according to the 
applicable facts and law.”). 
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individual cases, judges are not acting as legislative politicians but are 
“perform[ing] their role in governance by exercising their proclivities in cases 
where the governing legal materials are less clear.”42 Whatever mechanisms used 
to ensure the accountability of elected representatives like legislators—such as 
recall—should be narrowly and carefully applied to judges.43 As Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts, Jr. noted in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, “judges are not 
politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot.”44 
III. THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
To ensure that judges abide by the rule of law, a healthy state judicial system 
requires a degree of judicial independence.45 Legal scholar Charles Gardner Geyh 
succinctly defines judicial independence as “the capacity of individual judges to 
decide cases without threats or intimidation that could interfere with their ability 
to uphold the rule of law.”46 To preserve the courtroom as a “citadel of public 
justice and public security,” the idea of judicial independence evolved to ensure 
that the court remains not influenced by politics, but by the facts arising from 
each individual case.47 The rule of law ought to control the outcome of a case—
not public emotions, not public anger and frustration, and not the constituents 
themselves.48 A results-oriented evaluation of the judiciary disregards judicial 
independence by slowly eroding a judge’s role in upholding the rule of law.49 
“Judicial independence demands that public and political scrutiny …  focus on 
the process rather than the result.”50 
In direct response to the unwavering amount of judicial independence in the 
federal system, states developed various systems for selecting and removing 
judges.51 Kermit L. Hall describes the struggle in balancing judicial 
independence with judicial accountability in American federal and state courts as 
a “tale of two pities.”52 The first “pity” refers to an independent, but 
 
42. Cross, supra note 40.  
43. Infra Part VI (discussing the implications arising from the use of recall in a judicial context).  
44. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).  
45. Infra Part VI (discussing the implications arising from the use of recall in a judicial context such as 
harsher sentencing). 
46. ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING JUDICIAL SELECTION IN STATE COURTS 
20 (2016), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Rethinking_Judicial 
_Selection_ State_Courts.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing Charles Gardner 
Geyh, Methods of Judicial Selection & Their Impact on Judicial Independence, 137 DAEDALUS 86, 88 (2008)).  
47. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); BANNON, supra note 46, at 6. 
48. Hall, supra note 36, at 61; BANNON, supra note 46, at 6. 
49. Rylaarsdam, supra note 30, at 1653.  
50. Id. 
51. See generally BANNON, supra note 46, at 4 (showing that states use a variety of manners in electing 
judges: non-partisan elections, merit selections, gubernatorial appointments, partisan elections, hybrid selection 
processes, or legislative appointments). 
52. Hall, supra note 36, at 81. 
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unaccountable, federal judiciary.53 The second pity refers to an accountable, but 
non-independent, judiciary in state courts.54 When states become too intertwined 
and preoccupied with judicial accountability as a primary concern, it risks 
leaving judicial independence as a secondary concern.55 Striking a balance is 
important to preserve a judge’s ability to effectuate the rule of law; however, 
states like California have placed too much emphasis on judicial accountability 
with “unregulated” recall processes.56 
IV. SELECTING JUDGES AS A METHOD OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
State courts are traditionally more “accountable but insufficiently 
independent” compared to the “appointive and largely unaccountable” judges in 
federal courts.57 While federal court judges enjoy life tenure after being selected, 
state court judges must be reelected or retained after a certain number of years.58 
Part A of this Section elaborates on how the nomination process of federal judges 
stresses the value of judicial independence.59 
Part B discusses how states responded to the unwavering amount of judicial 
independence in federal courts.60 The first wave of reform from the traditional 
nomination process took the form of partisan judicial elections in state courts, as 
discussed in Subsection 1 of Part B.61 Critics of partisan judicial elections later 
advanced two arguments in opposition.62 First, critics argued that judicial 
selection should not involve political parties like legislative elections.63 Secondly, 
critics were concerned with whether the electorate could meaningfully evaluate 
judicial candidates.64 Thus, partisan judicial elections underwent two additional 
waves of reform in judicial selection since the 1830s.65 Subsection 2 of this 




55. Infra Parts IV, V, VII. 
56. Infra Parts IV, V, VII (explaining all the judicial accountability measures that are in effect to aid 
judicial accountability impede on judicial independence). 
57. Hall, supra note 36, at 81. 
58. Compare Part IV.A (discussing judicial selection in federal court) with Part IV.B (discussing judicial 
selection in state courts). 
59. Infra Part IV.A. 
60. Supra Part IV.B. 
61. Supra Part III.B.1 (discussing partisan judicial elections).  
62. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 7 (2009). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 8. 
65. Id. 
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judicial elections.66 Subsection 3 of this Section discusses the third wave of 
transformation leading to merit selection.67 
A. Judicial Selection in Federal Court 
Under the United States Constitution, federal judges are selected through an 
appointment process—these judges are nominated by the President, and 
confirmed with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.68 Federal 
judges represent the epitome of judicial independence because they have life 
tenure, enjoy salaries that cannot be reduced, and can be removed only through 
impeachment.69 
Political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville warned, “there is hardly ever a 
political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a 
judicial one.”70 Thus, the nation’s courtrooms allow judges to settle matters of 
public policy, which some argue is a job reserved for elected representatives who 
represent majority will.71 Viewed in this light, arguably, these “public policy” 
judges should be accountable through elections just like their colleagues in the 
legislature.72 However, judges who simply apply the law to public policy 
determinations are not “public policy” makers like elected representatives.73 In 
fact, “it is precisely this independence rooted in professional attributes that makes 
the courts such a welcome place to send the political buck.”74 In other words, it is 
the rule of law at work in the federal court that separates judicial policymaking 
from traditional legislative policymaking.75 
Perhaps the most popular argument against the federal system and its 
emphasis on judicial independence is the “countermajoritarian difficulty”—the 
idea that a vote of five of the nine unelected members of the Supreme Court can 
result in overturning federal and state legislation and public policies signed into 
law by elected representatives.76 These detractors present the countermajoritarian 
difficulty as the most un-democratic part of our constitutionally created judicial 
 
66. Supra Part III.B.2 (discussing non-partisan judicial elections). 
67. Supra Part III.B.3 (discussing merit selection). 
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President has the power to appoint, with Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, Justices of the Supreme Court and all other Officers of the United States). 
69. Hall, supra note 36, at 60. 
70. Id. at 69. 
71. Id. 
72. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 11. 
73. Hall, supra note 36, at 69–70. 
74. Id. at 70. 
75. See generally Geyh, supra note 31 (a judge following the rule of law not legislating the manner 
elected representatives enact law). 
76.  Hall, supra note 36, at 62. 
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system.77 “How can a non-elective judiciary be justified in a democratic 
regime?”78 
The answer is rather straightforward: there is no need for an elected judiciary 
because “the American system is not a pure democracy.”79 As explained by 
Kermit L. Hall, 
[[T]he American system] is a constitutional democracy forged on two 
competing principles: a commitment to government founded on the will 
of the people and a simultaneous commitment to limit the excesses of 
popular will through resort to fundamental law. This latter concept holds 
that there are fixed rights guaranteed to each individual . . . . The 
judiciary has emerged as the instrument to interpret that fundamental law 
and in theory the best hope for the rights of individuals and minorities. 
To preserve the balance in the constitutional system, judges must be free 
of direct political influence.80 
Thus, the framework of America’s constitutional democracy does not 
demand or mandate that every single judge be elected and re-elected.81 Rather, in 
the federal system, judges are given the leeway and the independence to preserve 
the rights guaranteed to those individuals.82 Electing these judges would 
dangerously shift what are constitutional guarantees and protections to what the 
popular will demands.83 The federal system leaves ample room for federal judges 
to run their courtrooms without political influence in order to prevent majority 
will from overtaking the basic, fundamental rights of minorities.84 
B. Judicial Selection in State Court 
In contrast, modern state court judges are undoubtedly more accountable to 
the people than federal judges, and traditionally enjoy less judicial independence 
than their federal counterparts by virtue of the judicial selection process.85 First, 
there are no state equivalents to the life-tenure provisions afforded to Article III 
judges by the U.S. Constitution; in fact, “[a]lmost all states have a fixed term of 
years for judges, and many also have a mandatory retirement age.”86 These 
 
77. Id. at 62–63. 
78. Id. at 63. 
79. Id. (italics added).  
80. Id. (italics added).  
81. Id.  
82. Id.  
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 60, 81. 
85. James D. Miller, State Disciplinary Proceedings and the Impartiality of Judges, in STATE 
JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES 119, 119 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996).  
86. Id.  
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standards create a system of accountability that is unparalleled at the federal 
level.87 Moreover, state judicial elections gained traction from the strong belief 
that judges are important political actors who should be deriving their power 
from the people like political players from other governmental institutions—
making these judges even more accountable than their federal counterparts.88 
Compared to federal courts, the number of cases that state courts resolve may 
explain the historic rise in judicial elections at the state level.89 “Nearly all felony 
convictions—94%—occur in state courts, including 99% of rape cases and 98% 
of murder cases.”90 Over 100 million cases come before almost 30,000 state court 
judges each year.91 Undoubtedly, state courts also play a crucial role in 
developing American law.92 For example, modern state supreme courts play a 
significant role in developing areas of tort law, contract law, criminal procedure, 
property rights, and state constitutional rights.93 Thus, because “[t]he great body 
of day-to-day justice has taken place and continues to take place in the state and 
not the federal courts,” states may have felt obligated to ensure greater degrees of 
judicial accountability vis-à-vis elections.94 Each wave of reform in the judicial 
selection process is discussed here in turn.95 
1. The First Wave: Partisan Democratic Elections 
Most states first replaced the nomination process with a partisan election—an 
election process where the candidates’ political parties are designated on the 
ballot.96 Voters often rely on a candidate’s political party as a cue or meaningful 
basis when casting their vote.97 Currently, 13 states use the partisan democratic 
election in electing state trial court judges.98 Political scientists Chris Bonneau 
 
87. Id. 
88. C.f. supra, Part II (discussing the role of judges and that their adherence to the role of law is of the 
utmost importance); see also BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 5, 7 (contending that elected judges are 
essentially politicians). 
89. KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 1 
(2015), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/How_Judicial_Elections 
_Impact_Criminal_Cases.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); BANNON, supra note 46, 
at 1.  
90. BERRY, supra note 89, at 1. 
91. BANNON, supra note 46, at 1. 
92. Hall, supra note 36, at 64. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Infra Part III.B.1.  
96. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 5, 7. 
97. Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/partisan-vs-
nonpartisan-elections (last visited Dec. 30, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
98. Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., http://www. 
judicialselection.com /judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited Dec. 30, 2016) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (states using a partisan election system in selecting trial 
court judges: Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
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and Melinda Gann Hall believe “democratic politics is alive and well in the 
American states”99 and there are “three primary reasons why judicial elections 
gained popularity.”100 First, people felt judges were invalidating laws enacted by 
legislatures and making political choices like their legislative counterparts.101 
Second, people felt that an elected judiciary was an opportunity to build its own 
separate constituency to ensure independence from the legislature.102 Lastly, 
popular elections allowed people to remove “incompetent and arrogant judges” in 
place of more drastic and political forms of punishment for judicial misconduct 
or incompetence—such as impeachment.103 
Proponents of pure democratic elections of judges argue that elections 
“facilitate self-government by empowering the people to hold accountable these 
important officials.”104 Another group of scholars believes judicial elections 
reaffirm the principle of popular sovereignty,105 serve as an accountability 
mechanism,106 act as a channel for dialogue between the public and the elected 
official,107 and teach the importance of civic duty.108 
Critics argue that judicial selection should not involve political parties like 
legislative elections, for fear that political parties want to control what is 
considered the third, neutral branch of government.109 Secondly, critics are 
concerned with whether the electorate could meaningfully evaluate judicial 
candidates.110 Because voters are not well-educated on the issues and the 
candidates, elections risk the “institutional quality and integrity” of an entire 
branch of government.111 Nonetheless, partisan democratic elections are still used 
in judicial selection in several states to hold judges accountable before they take 
office.112 These partisan elections give the public more frequent opportunities to 
 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia). 
99.  BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 139. 
100. Id. at 5. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 5, 7. 
103. Id.  
104. David Pozen, Are Judicial Elections Democracy Enhancing, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 
WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 248, 248 (Charles Gardner Geyh, ed., 2011). 
105. Id. at 249–50. 
106. Id. at 250–51. 
107. Id. at 251. 
108. Id. at 252. 
109.  BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 7; Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, 
http://www.nlc.org/partisan-vs-nonpartisan-elections (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
110. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 8. 
111. Id. at 261. 
112. See generally Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, supra note 98 (states using a 
partisan election system in selecting trial court judges: Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, 
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia). 
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evaluate a judge’s qualifications during election season compared to the 
politically driven nomination process for federal judges.113 
2. The Second Wave: Non-Partisan Elections 
In response to allegations that judicial partisan elections lead to political 
party corruption and control over the judicial bench, progressives began to 
remove candidates’ party affiliations from the ballot around 1900.114 States began 
adopting non-partisan judicial elections, which are competitive elections in the 
traditional sense except ballots do not include the partisan affiliations of the 
candidates.115 The proponents of non-partisan elections believe that these 
elections meet the competing interests for electoral accountability and protection 
against partisanship.116 These proponents also believe that political parties are 
irrelevant to the election of judges.117 
However, the switch to non-partisan elections did not keep the same electoral 
interest that partisan elections had because non-partisan elections were “much 
less competitive and citizen participation plummeted,” likely as a result of the 
inability to vote along party lines.118 Today, 20 states—including California—use 
non-partisan elections as part of their scheme in reviewing judges, after their 
term expires for reelection.119 In comparison with the federal nomination process, 
this non-partisan election process more directly ensures accountability with the 
public-at-large.120 
3. The Third Wave: Merit Selection 
The third wave of reform took the form of merit selection, originally 
proposed in 1913, and combined the best features of the appointment system 
 
113. Infra Part IV.B.2; see, e.g., Cristian Farlas, Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court Nomination Just Died 
With the Old Congress, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 03, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/merrick-
garland-supreme-court-nomination-dead_us_586be633e4b0de3a08f9a8f2 (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (Merrick Garland’s nomination to the United States Supreme Court as an example of a 
political judicial appointment, and not subject to accountability by the people).  
114. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 8. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections, supra note 97. 
118. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 8. 
119. Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, supra note 98 (states that use a non-partisan 
election system in selecting trial court judges: Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
120. Compare Part IV.A (discussing that there are no ways for the public at large to directly influence the 
nomination of a federal district court judge) with Part IV.B.2 (discussing that non-partisan elections demands 
the public at large to vote to secure a state court judge’s position).  
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(independence) and the electoral system (accountability) of selecting judges.121 
Under merit selection, a judge is initially appointed by the state governor from a 
list of candidates submitted by a nominating commission, and the judge serves 
for a period of time before constituents vote for the candidate in a retention 
election.122 If the judge fails to win retention, the process begins anew.123 
Merit selection was designed to ensure a “more qualified bench and [to] 
remove political considerations from selecting judges.”124 Merit selection was 
intended to provide maximum independence because judges run unopposed 
during a retention election, and are no longer dependent on the governor and state 
legislatures for reappointment.125 Today, 19 states use the merit selection process 
to ensure judges are qualified.126 
In comparison, the President selects federal district court judges through 
nomination, without any input, vote, or influence from the public-at-large, while 
state court judges require the attention of the people by way of partisan, non-
partisan, and merit selection processes.127 Thus, all states—including 
California—tether their state judges to public accountability by requiring a judge 
to participate in a political process such as an election or retention election to 
keep their jobs.128 These requirements alone make selection of state court judges 
more accountable to the public than federal court judges.129 
V. DISCIPLINING & REMOVING JUDGES AS A METHOD OF JUDICIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The most traditional method of accountability is the disciplining, and 
ultimate removal, of judges.130 This Section compares the federal and state 
methods of disciplining and removing judges.131 “[T]he current methods of 
removing judges in the fifty state constitutions reflect the continued diversity in 
 
121. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 62, at 8. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 9. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. 
126. See Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, supra note 98 (states that use a merit 
selection system in selecting trial court judges: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode 
Island, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming). 
127. Compare Part IV.A (discussing judicial selection of federal judges) with Part IV.B (discussing 
judicial selection of state court judges). 
128. Compare Part IV.A (discussing that there are no ways for the public at large to directly influence the 
nomination of a federal district court judge) with Part IV.B.2 (discussing that non-partisan elections demands 
the public at large to vote to secure a state court judge’s position). 
129. Compare Part IV.A (discussing judicial selection of federal judges) with Part IV.B (discussing 
judicial selection of state court judges). 
130. Infra Parts V.A and V.B. 
131. Infra Parts V.A and V.B. 
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how each state balances judicial independence with judicial accountability.”132 
Part A of this Section elaborates on impeachment—the only manner of removing 
a federal district court judge.133 Part B of this Section discusses how states have 
developed various methods in disciplining and removing judges: the most 
popular methods are impeachment,134 review by commissions of judicial 
conduct,135 and recall.136 
A. Removing a Judge in Federal Court 
It is only possible to remove a federal judge is if he or she is impeached and 
convicted for “high crimes.”137 To successfully remove a federal judge, the 
House of Representatives must exercise its power to impeach,138 and the United 
States Senate must exercise its power to convict based on the articles of 
impeachment.139 Judicial impeachment is extremely rare in our nation’s 
history.140 Only one United States Supreme Court justice has ever been 
impeached—Associate Justice Samuel Chase for arbitrary and oppressive 
conduct during trials.141 Moreover, only one judge from the United States 
Commerce Court has been impeached—Judge Robert W. Archbald for improper 
business relationships with litigants.142 Judge Archbald was also the only Circuit 
Court of Appeals judge to be removed from office.143 
Perhaps not so surprisingly, most judicial impeachments happens with 
federal district court judges; and of 13 impeachments of federal district court 
judges, eight federal district court judges have been successfully impeached and 
removed by the Senate.144 The most recent impeachment and exercise of this 
 
132. Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Independence with Accountability, 5 
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117, 121 (2000). 
133. Infra Part V.A. 
134. Infra Part V.B.1. 
135. Infra Part V.B.2. 
136. Infra Part V.B.3. 
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (stating that the civil officers shall be removed from office on impeachment 
for conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes). 
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
140. See Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
judges/impeachments-federal-judges (last visited Dec. 30, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (listing all the incidents of impeachment of a federal Article III judge). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. (Judge Robert W. Archbald sat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). 
144. Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate, For Just the 8th Time, Votes To Oust a Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/us/politics/09judge.html (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review); see also Impeachments of Federal Judges, supra note 140 (naming all federal district 
court judges who have been impeached and its outcomes: Judge John Pickering of the District Court of New 
Hampshire (1804, convicted), Judge James H. Peck of the District Court of Missouri (1831, acquitted), Judge 
West H. Humphreys of the District Court for the Middle, Eastern, and Western Districts of Tennessee (1862, 
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method of judicial accountability in federal court is the impeachment and 
conviction of Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana.145 According to the House of 
Representatives, Judge Porteous exhibited a “pattern of conduct incompatible 
with the trust and confidence placed in him.”146 The House charged him with four 
articles “stemming from charges that he received cash and favors from lawyers 
who had dealings in his court, used a false name to elude creditors and 
intentionally mislead the Senate during his confirmation proceedings.”147 The 
Senate convicted him on all articles, and voted to disqualify him from ever 
holding federal office again.148 
B. Removing a Judge in State Court 
Compared to the federal system and its single system for accountability in its 
impeachment process, state court judges are held accountable and can be 
removed from office in several ways.149 There are three popular categories in 
which state judges are held accountable at the state level: impeachment,150 review 
by judicial commissions,151 and recall.152 All three procedures are available in 
California, and are discussed herein.153 
1. Removal by Impeachment 
Today, nearly all 50 states offer an impeachment process to remove a state 
trial court judge.154 California is among 48 states that have adopted the federal 
 
convicted), Judge Mark W. Delahay of the District of Kansas (1873, resigned), Judge Charles Swayne of the 
Northern District of Florida (1905, acquitted), Judge George W. English of the Eastern District of Illinois (1926, 
resigned), Judge Harold Louderback of the Northern District of California (1933, acquitted), Judge Halsted L. 
Ritter of the Southern District of Florida (1936, convicted), Judge Harry E. Claiborne of the District of Nevada 
(1986, convicted), Judge Alcee L. Hastings of the Southern District of Florida (1989, convicted), Judge Walter 
L. Nixon of the Southern District of Mississippi (1989, convicted), Judge Samuel B. Kent of the Southern 
District of Texas (2009, resigned), Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. of the Eastern District of Louisiana (2010, 
convicted)).  
145. Steinhauer, supra note 144.  
146. Id.  
147. Id.  
148. Id.  
149. See Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., 
http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/methods/removal_of_ judges.cfm?state= (last visited Jan. 2, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (most categories can be divided into 
impeachment, judicial commissions, and recall processes). 
150. Infra Part V.B.1. 
151. Infra Part V.B.2. 
152. Infra Part V.B.3; see generally Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, supra note 18 
(most categories can be divided into impeachment, judicial commissions, and recall processes). 
153. Infra Parts V.B.1 to V.B.3; Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, supra note 18. 
154. See generally Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, supra note 18 (states that use a 
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government’s way of removing judicial officers.155 Only two states do not allow 
for the impeachment process: Hawaii and Oregon.156 
To illustrate, residents of Montana recently tried to start the impeachment of 
Judge John McKeon for not upholding “the responsibility of ensuring justice as 
he is required to in his elected position.”157 Like Judge Persky’s and Judge 
Kelly’s decisions to lessen sentences, Judge McKeon gave an allegedly lenient 
sentence, only 60 days in jail, to a man who incestuously raped his 12-year-old 
daughter.158 The man served 43 days.159 Judge McKeon apparently did not follow 
a statutorily mandated sentence for people who commit incest.160 The Montana 
incest statute states that “if [a] victim was 12 years of age or younger and the 
offender was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense, the offender shall 
be punished by imprisonment in a state prison for a term of 100 years.”161 “The 
Court may not suspend execution or defer imposition of the first 25 years of a 
sentence of imprisonment imposed [] and the offender may not be eligible for 
parole.”162 
Montana follows an impeachment process similar to the impeachment 
processes for Article III judges in the federal judiciary.163 In Judge McKeon’s 
situation, there was mounting media pressure, and “Internet activism” led to a 
petition on Change.org of over 80,000 names to start impeachment 
 
provide impeachment as a method of removing a state judge include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
155. Id. 
156. See id. (explaining that Hawaii has a commission on judicial conduct which has “authority to 
investigate and conduct hearings concerning allegations of judicial misconduct or disability and to recommend 
to the supreme court that a judge be reprimanded, disciplined, retired, or removed,” and explaining that Oregon 
judges can be removed in one of two ways: “on the recommendation of the commission on judicial fitness and 
disability, the supreme court may censure, suspend, retire, or remove a judge” and “judges are subject to recall 
election”). 
157. Rebecca Hersher, Montana Judge Faces Call For Impeachment After Incest Sentencing, NPR: TWO 
WAY (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/10/20/498676414/montana-judge-faces-
call-for-impeachment-after-incest-sentencing (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
158. Compare Stack, Light Sentence, supra note 13 and Kelly Puente, Petition Moves Forward to Recall 
O.C. Judge M. Marc Kelly Over Sexual Assault Ruling, ORANGE COUNTY REP. (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/judge-676004-kelly-recall.html (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) with Hersher, supra note 157.  
159. Hersher, supra note 157. 
160. Id. 
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-507 (5)(a)(i) (West 2016). 
162. Id. § 45-5-507 (5)(a)(iii).  
163. Compare MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 13 (1), (3) (2016) (stating that judicial officers are subject to 
impeachment and impeachment shall be brought only by a two-thirds vote of the house) with U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 4 (stating that the civil officers shall be removed from office on impeachment for conviction of treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes). 
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proceedings.164 However, Judge McKeon had already announced his retirement a 
month before he issued the sentence, and will likely not have to go through the 
impeachment process.165 
2. Removal by Judicial Commission on Judicial Conduct 
Another popular method of removing judges is upon review by commissions 
investigating judicial misconduct.166 Nearly all states, including California, have 
some sort of investigatory and disciplinary body to determine whether a judge 
committed judicial misconduct.167 Only two states do not have any form of a 
commission designed to investigate complaints or to discipline judicial officers 
for judicial misconduct: Maine (which only allows for impeachment initiated by 
the Maine House of Representatives, or address by the governor to both houses 
of the state legislature) and West Virginia (which only allows for impeachment 
of judicial officers).168 
These commissions and review boards play different roles in each state.169 In 
most states, the commission on judicial conduct only has the power to 
recommend to the highest court of the state or a “court on the judiciary” that a 
state judge be removed from office.170 Other states where a commission could 
directly remove a judge include California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, 
New York, and Utah.171 
In California, the Commission on Judicial Performance (“Commission”) is 
an independent state agency responsible for investigating complaints of judicial 
misconduct and judicial incapacity for disciplining judges.172 Article VI, Section 
18 of the California Constitution grants the Commission authority to conduct its 
 
164. Rick Anderson, Montana Judge, Facing Impeachment Threat for Lenient Rape Sentencing, Set to 
Retire Next Month, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-montana-judge-impeach-
20161021-snap-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
165. Id. 
166. See Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, supra note 18  (states that have commissions 
on judicial conduct include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 




170. See generally id. (states that have commissions that may recommend the highest court for the state to 
remove a trial judge: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming). 
171. Id. 
172. STATE OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, https://cjp.ca.gov/ (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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investigations.173 The “mandate” of the Commission is to protect the public and 
to maintain public confidence in the integrity and independence of the judicial 
system.174 In California, the “commission may impose sanctions ranging from 
confidential discipline to removal from office.”175 
The Commission has 11 members total, including a justice from the court of 
appeal, two judges of the superior courts appointed by the Supreme Court of 
California, and two attorneys appointed by the Governor of California.176 
Interestingly, six lay citizens are also appointed to the Commission—two 
appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules, two appointed by the Speaker of 
the Assembly, and two appointed by the Governor of California.177 More than 
half of the Commission members are lay individuals without any legal 
knowledge.178 The Commission’s members represent a diverse group of 
individuals who ensure that judges are accountable to the rule of law.179 
In December 2016, the Commission concluded that Judge Persky’s sentence 
was “within the parameters set by law and therefore within the judge’s 
discretion.”180 The panel stated, “there is not clear and convincing evidence of 
bias, abuse of authority, or other basis to conclude that Judge Persky engaged in 
judicial misconduct warranting discipline.”181 The recall effort led by Professor 
Michele Dauber fired back and stated the “recall is the only realistic way to 
remove Judge Persky from office” and the “petition for judicial discipline was 
not the correct venue to address [their] concerns” about an alleged “clear pattern 
of bias.”182 However, the Commission’s impartial decision should not be 
disturbed because the impartial group of experts and laypersons have determined 
there was no “clear pattern of bias” to warrant sanctions or removal.183 
 
173. Id.  
174. Id. 
175. Id.  
176. Members & Meetings, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, 
https://cjp.ca.gov/members_meetings/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. (assuming the six “lay” people are not attorneys or hold a legal background or education). 
179. See generally STATE OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 172 
(implying that following the rule of law is not grounds for removal by stating that judges are removed for 
judicial misconduct and judicial incapacity). 
180. Veronica Rocha, Judicial Panel Clears California Judge Who Gave Lenient Sentence in Stanford 
Sexual Assault, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-judge-aaron-persky-
no-judicial-misconduct -20161219-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
181. Id. 
182. Statement: Recall Judge Persky Chair Re: Commission on Judicial Performance, RECALL JUDGE 
AARON PERSKY (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/statement_recall_judge_persky_ 
chair_re_commission_on_judicial_performance (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
183. Rocha, supra note 180. 
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3. Removal by Recall 
In the last, and certainly the least used method of removing judges, 
California, among eight other states, allows for the judicial recall of elected state 
court judges.184 A recall is a special election to unseat an elected official—
including judges—before his or her term expires.185 Specifically, the California 
Constitution generally defines recall as “the power of the electors to remove an 
elective officer.”186 
California has an unsuccessful history of recalling judges.187 Many of these 
elections are based on emotional outrage at the outcome of judicial decision-
making.188 Judge M. Marc Kelly faced such a situation in 2015 when 
Californians in Orange County petitioned to recall him for reducing the sentence 
of a convicted pedophile from a statutory 25-year sentence to 10 years.189 Judge 
Nancy Wieben Stock of the Orange County Superior Court faced a recall effort 
after awarding O.J. Simpson full custody of his children after his acquittal in the 
highly publicized murder trial of his ex-wife.190 One of the earlier recall efforts 
occurred after Judge Joyce A. Karlin of the Los Angeles Superior Court 
sentenced Korean storeowner Soon Ja Du to five years of probation and no 
imprisonment for killing an African American teenage girl that she suspected of 
shoplifting at the height of the 1992 Los Angeles riots.191 
In another famous recall effort, California voters tried to recall Rose Bird, the 
former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court.192 Chief Justice Bird 
 
184. See Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of Judges, supra note 18 (Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin are the only states where judges are subject to recall 
elections). 
185. Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
elections-and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
186. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 13. 
187. See Hector Tobar, Judge Who Gave Probation in ‘91 Killing Quits, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1997), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1997-02-11/local/me-27514_1_court-judge (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review); Court Overturns Ruling Giving Simpson Custody of 2 Children, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/11/us/court-overturns-ruling-giving-simpson-custody-of-2-children.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
188. See, e.g., Tobar, supra note 187; Puente, supra note 158; Todd S. Purdum, Rose Bird, Once 
California’s Chief Justice, Is Dead at 63, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/ 
12/06/us/rose-bird-once-california-s-chief-justice-is-dead-at-63.html (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
189. Puente, supra note 158. 
190. Court Overturns Ruling Giving Simpson Custody of 2 Children, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/11/us/court-overturns-ruling-giving-simpson-custody-of-2-children.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
191. Greg Krikorian, Karlin Urges Voters to Reject Recall: Courts: In First Public Statement, Judge in 
Korean Grocer Case Says Her Removal Would Attack Constitution. Opponents Vow to Support Effort, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 9, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-09/local/me-2292_1_recall-effort (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
192. Purdum, supra note 188.   
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survived “repeated efforts” to recall her because she never upheld death 
sentences during her tenure.193 In fact, she voted each time to vacate the 
sentences—a total of 61 times.194 Chief Justice Bird, along with two other 
Associate Justices, was ultimately removed during a retention election, not a 
recall effort.195 She was the first justice to fail to win a retention election in 
California history.196 
VI. THE INESCAPABLE CONSEQUENCES OF “UNREGULATED” JUDICIAL RECALL 
IN CALIFORNIA 
There are various methods of judicial accountability: election,197 
impeachment,198 review and removal by commissions of judicial misconduct,199 
mandatory judicial opinion writing,200 appellate courts,201 and legislation.202 
However, judicial accountability cannot impede on judicial independence.203 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted that, if judges are succumbing to 
political pressures, the judicial system loses its integrity as an institution.204 
Recall is a particularly dangerous political pressure that threatens the 
integrity of California courts because of the following explicit language in the 
California Constitution: “Recall of a state officer is initiated by delivering to the 
Secretary of State a petition alleging reason for recall. Sufficiency of reason is not 
reviewable.”205 The constitutional language provides that, for a successful recall 
petition, the only requirement is a 200-word statement of the reason for the 
 
193. Id.   
194. Id.   
195. Id.   
196.  Id.  
197. Supra Part IV (discussing how judges in certain states are elected under one of three regimes).  
198. Supra Part V.A (discussing the removal process of federal judges through impeachment). 
199. Supra Part V.B (discssing the removal of state court judges through a commission of judicial 
misconduct). 
200. See generally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 
(1989) (discussing the importance of legal reasoning and its role in American courts for maintaining consistent 
precedent).  
201. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237 (West 2016) (establishing the statutory right to an appeal 
criminal convictions).  
202. See generally id. §§ 263.1 (enacted by 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 848), 1203.065 (amended by 2016 Cal. 
Stat. Ch. 863) (examples of legislation that the California Legislature enacted in response to the Brock Turner 
decision to ensure a minimum sentencing); Daniel Kreps, California Governor Signs Law Enforcing Mandatory 
Prison for Sexual Assaults, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/ 
California-passes-law-enforcing-mandatory-prison-for-sexual-assaultsw442950 (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
203. Supra Part III (analyzing the definition and importance of judicial independence). 
204. Woodward v. State, 123 So. 3d 989 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 405, 408 (2013) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
205. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 14(a) (emphasis added).  
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petition, and this reason is not reviewable.206 So long as the petition garners 
enough signatures, it could succeed at removing any elected official—even a 
judge who follows the law appropriately—regardless of the stated reason for 
recall.207 
When the reason for recalling a judge cannot be reviewed for substance, 
content, and legitimacy, the decision to remove a judge can be based on emotion 
and politics arising from a judicial decision that may be well within the 
boundaries of law.208 For example, in the Soon Ja Du case, recall efforts were 
based on the heightened outrage stemming from racial disparities at the time.209 
In the Rose Bird example, people were outraged only at Chief Justice’s anti-
death penalty stance.210 Because neither of these recall efforts focused on the law 
supporting the judicial decisions, state judges in California could begin to focus 
more on the political whims of the public whereas “federal judges never worry 
about Change.org petitions, or ‘open letters’ posted on Facebook, not because 
they are cold or unfeeling, but because their job is specifically designed to be 
immune to that kind of social pressure.”211 Including the Brock Turner example, 
these recall efforts have focused on the politics of the decision.212 Thus, under the 
current language of the California Constitution, what a person may believe to be 
a moral or ethical wrong in coming to a final judicial decision, but not 
necessarily a legal wrong, can be a proper basis for successful recall.213 However, 
when the judge’s decisions are based on the rule of law, it should not be a proper 
basis for recalling the judge.214 
In the Brock Turner scenario, proponents of the recall effort allege that Judge 
Persky’s decision perpetuates white male and class privilege when compared to 
the harsher sentence he gave another defendant, Raul Ramirez, for an allegedly 
similar crime.215 However, the recall effort to remove Judge Persky is not 
 
206. Id.; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10020 (West); Procedure for Recalling State and Local Officials, CAL. 
SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/recalls/procedure-recalling-state-and-local-officials/ (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
207. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 14(a); Procedure for Recalling State and Local Officials, supra note 206. 
208. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 14(a). 
209. Krikorian, supra note 191. 
210. See, e.g., Purdum, supra note 188 (basing the recall effort of Chief Justice Bird because she was 
classified as a “soft-on-crime” liberal, but not challenging on the legality of her decision making). 
211. See, e.g., Krikorian, supra note 191 (basing the recall effort on racial tensions immediately after the 
L.A. riots); Purdum, supra note 188 (basing the recall effort of Chief Justice Bird because she was classified as 
a “soft-on-crime” liberal, but not challenging on the legality of her decision making); Danny Cevallos, Judge 
Persky’s Sentence in Stanford Rape Case Unpopular But Legal, CNN (June 11, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2016/06/10/opinions/stanford-rape-case-cevallos/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (all 
examples of attempted California judicial recalls). 
212. RECALL JUDGE AARON PERSKY, http://www.recallaaronpersky.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (on 
file with The University of the Pacific) (mentioning that the recall effort is based on allegations that Judge 
Aaron Persky does not understand sexual assault and violence against women).  
213. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 14(a). 
214. Supra Part II (discussing the role of judges and the rule of law). 
215. Stack, Light Sentence, supra note 13; Sam Levin, Stanford Trial Judge Overseeing Much Harsher 
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unopposed.216 Opponents argue that Ramirez’s case is starkly different than 
Turner’s in several respects: age,217 level of intoxication,218 citizenship status,219 
bail,220 and victim consent.221 Attorneys, law professors, and former judges have 
opposed the recall and view recall as a serious threat to judicial independence.222 
The Santa Clara County District Attorney and public defenders have come 
together to oppose the recall.223 Molly O’Neal, the Santa Clara County Public 
Defender, stated, “We need to be very careful we’re not hanging judges out to 
dry based on one decision, especially because he is considered to be a fair and 
even-tempered judge.”224 
By not reviewing whether the reasons for recall in California are 
substantively sound, recall threatens lawful decisions in state courts by subjecting 
 
Sentence for Similar Assault Case, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/jun/27/stanford-sexual-assault-trial-judge-persky (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review).  
216. See, e.g., Debriefing and Defending the Brock Turner Sentence, in Closing Arguments, TUMBLR 
(June 8, 2016), http://thesajidakhan.tumblr.com/post/145573169734/debriefing-and-defending-the-brock-turner-
sentence (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (one example of opposition to the recall of 
Judge Aaron Persky).  
217. Jason Silverstein, Brock Turner Judge Gives Harsher Sentence to an Immigrant, DAILY NEWS (June 
27, 2016, 10:05 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/brock-turner-judge-harsher-sentence-
immigrant-article-1.2689471 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (Turner was 20 years old 
at the time of the offense, and Ramirez was 32 years old at the time of the offense). 
218. Tyler Kingkade, Brock Turner Repeatedly Used Alcohol As An Excuse For The Sexual Assault He 
Committed, HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brock-turner-drinking-
party-culture_us_5758259b e4b0e39a28ac015c (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(reporting that Turner was under the influence of alcohol during the time of the offense); Elena Kadvany, 
Turner-trial Judge Criticized for Bias in Assault Case, PALO ALTO ONLINE (July 8, 2016), 
http://www.paloaltoonline.com/print/story/2016/07/08/turner-trial-judge-criticized-for-bias-in-assault-case (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating differences between the Turner and Ramirez case 
was the former was under the influence).  
219. Silverstein, supra note 217 (explaining that Turner is a citizen of the United States; Ramirez is an 
immigrant from El Salvador).  
220. Id. (explaining that Turner’s bail was set at $150,000; Ramirez’s bail was set at $200,000). 
221. Compare Kadvany, supra note 218 (reporting that Ramirez sexually assaulted his pregnant 
roommate by blocking the door and fingering the victim until she cried), with Elena Kadvany, Brock Turner: 
Woman Gave Him Verbal Consent, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.paloaltoonline. 
com/news/2016/03/23/brock-turner-alleged-victim-gave-him-verbal-consent (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (reporting that the victim verbally and willingly consented to the sexual activity that she 
and Turner engaged in).  
222. Elena Kadvany, Brock Turner Judge Launches Anti-Recall Campaign, MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE 
(Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.mv-voice.com/news/2016/08/31/brock-turner-judge-launches-anti-recall-campaign 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Tracey Kaplan, Brock Turner: Leading Law School 
Professors Issue Letter Opposing Judge’s Recall, MERCURY NEWS (July 27, 2016), http://www. 
mercurynews.com/2016/07/27/brock-turner-leading-law-school-professors-issue-letter-opposing-judges-recall/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Acjpdebug, Stanford Law School Graduates Submit 
Letter to Reconsider Recall Effort to Judge Persky, ACJUSTICEPROJECT.ORG (June 22, 2016), 
https://acjusticeproject.org/2016/06/22/stanford-law-school-graduates-submit-letter-to-reconsider-recall-effort-
of-judge-persky/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
223. Liam Stack, Judge Aaron Persky Under Fire, supra note 15. 
224. Id. 
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the judicial officer not only to review by courts of appeal, but also by the public 
at large—a group comprised of people that have no legal education or experience 
in making sure laws are properly followed and applied.225 When the “sufficiency 
of reason” for recall is not reviewable, the recall is “unregulated” because any 
reason a person may have for removing a California trial judge is a viable reason 
if there are sufficient signatures for a recall election.226 It becomes a pure 
numbers game based on signatures.227 
Research shows that California’s judicial recall is harmful, and questions 
whether recall is even necessary to ensure judicial accountability.228 Judicial 
elections lead to an increase in harsher sentencing and punishment in criminal 
cases, and in spending by special interest groups.229 Part A discusses how the 
threat of recall increases harsher sentencing.230 Part B examines how recall also 
increases spending by special interest groups.231 Part C analyzes how the public 
should not wield the power to remove a judge because of the likelihood for its 
future misuse.232 Ultimately, California’s “unregulated” recall is unnecessary for 
judicial accountability.233 
A. Judicial Recall Leads to Harsher Sentencing 
Unregulated judicial recall, like judicial elections, inevitably leads to 
unwarranted harsher sentences due to political pressures.234 Studies show that 
more punitive sentences against criminal defendants are given near election time 
because death penalty decisions promote a “tough on crime” campaign, which in 
turn helps the judge get reelected or retained on the bench.235 No judge in recent 
memory has run on a “soft on crime” campaign because “soft on crime” 
campaigns have been used to attack a judge’s platform during election.236 
When judges are susceptible to unregulated recalls, like in California, lawful 
sentences and criminal rulings are suddenly “reviewable” by the people 
 
225. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 14(a), (b). 
226. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 14(a). 
227. CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 14(b). 
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230. Infra Part VI.A. 
231. Infra Part VI.B. 
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political pressure that will also likely increase harsher sentencing). 
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whenever the decision comes out to see whether the judge was actually “tough on 
crime.”237 Thus, judges become more cognizant about how people outside of the 
courtroom might react.238 The constituency is the proverbial “political crocodile” 
creeping into the judge’s bathtub.239 This crocodile is comprised of constituent 
emotion, anger, and frustration, and these emotions impact sentencing especially 
during judicial elections or recalls.240 The logic is simple: people want to be 
liked, the desire to be liked affects behavior, and judges are people.241 Judges 
undoubtedly seek approval from their public audiences when their own position 
is at stake.242 When these public audiences become intertwined and influential on 
how judges sentence criminal defendants, it is mob justice by majority will.243 
These decisions should be based on the rule of law.244 
Mob justice not only affects the particular judge who is under the public 
microscope, but the judges across the state and country.245 What judges should be 
concerned with is the lawfulness of their decision, not the polarizing reactions the 
decision may cause.246 Studies have shown that judges increase the length of their 
sentences when judicial elections approach (i.e. when the judge’s own job 
security is at stake).247 In one of these studies, it was shown that judges impose 
death sentences more often in election years, even after a jury sentenced the 
criminal defendants to life imprisonment.248 In comparing the federal and state 
judiciaries, one scholar noted, “If judges couldn’t care less about retaining their 
office, the threat of future electoral sanctions would be empty.”249 
Since the population is generally riled up at sentences it perceives as “too 
lenient,” judges concerned about their reelection or retention at the state court 
level will likely hand down harsher sentences, based on what the public wants to 
see in a decision.250 When there are recall pressures—on top of these judicial 
elections—that threaten the judge halfway through their term, judges will 
consider the “popularity” of sentences before they impose them more often and 
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earlier within their term of office.251 This skews the criminal justice system by 
inviting public opinion into the decision-making of what is supposed be done by 
an impartial and apolitical judge.252 
B. Judicial Recall Politicizes Campaigns with Special Interest Groups 
Over the past few decades, judicial elections have become “nastier, noisier, 
and costlier.”253 Judicial elections look similar to the “rough and tumble of 
political campaigns—from attack ads, to super PACs, to million-dollar 
elections.”254 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the United States Supreme 
Court determined that the surge of money in elections dilutes judicial 
impartiality.255  Special interests have increased their attention and donations 
toward judicial elections.256 Judges in state courts that use electoral processes to 
secure their position on the bench “face pressure to decide cases in a way that 
will please donors and avoid politicized attacks, rather than based on their 
understanding of the facts and the law.”257 When money is poured into judicial 
elections, “wealthy interests are able to shape the ideological direction of the 
courts by spending large amounts of money on judicial candidates who share 
their worldview.”258 As Paul Pfiefer, an Ohio Supreme Court justice, commented, 
“I never felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station . . . as I did in a 
judicial race…. Everyone interested in contributing has very specific interests. 
They mean to be buying a vote.”259 Deep-pocketed interest groups come to shape 
and influence the composition of courts whenever they can.260 Election spending 
has soared since the United States Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. 
 
251. Id. at 7–8. 
252. Id. at 7–8. 
253. BANNON, supra note 46, at 6. 
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Law Review). 
256. BANNON, supra note 46, at 6; see also Geyh, supra note 31, at 49–50 (“interest groups have called 
attention to one or two decisions as proof that a particular judge was soft on crime. In Illinois, a judge faced a 
fierce retention battle because he was allegedly not soft enough. In California, the issue was abortion; in 
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funding, and then tort reform, which has likewise been a pivotal issue in Alabama, Michigan, Pennsylvania and 
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257. BANNON, supra note 46, at 6. 
258. Id.   
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the Pacific Law Review). 
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Federal Elections Commission, which held that restrictions on independent 
spending by corporations and unions during elections are unconstitutional.261 
When recall is an additional electoral process to judicial election, money can 
play an even larger role in influencing outcomes.262  Recalls are “expensive and 
labor intensive.”263 For example, when Wisconsin voters attempted to recall 
Governor Scott Walker, it cost nearly $81 million.264 With judicial recall, special 
interest groups further politicize the judiciary by investing more money in 
ensuring that their political views are the ones shared by judges and in making 
sure the judges that they do not like are removed from the bench, whenever the 
special interest groups want and prior to the end of the judge’s elected term.265 
“There is a significant relationship between interest group donations and judicial 
decisions.”266 
The increase in corporate treasury spending, when coupled with the 
availability of a political recall process, could lead to unrestricted money going 
into an attack on judges.267 Thus, when a judicial decision angers constituents, 
money should not be used to buy justice by rotating judges out for more 
favorable judges under an unregulated recall process.268 “Justice requires that 
judges put aside their political preferences and loyalties when deciding cases, and 
rule based on their understanding of the law and the facts at issue.”269 The 
detrimental effect of how special interest groups can spend money on not only 
selecting judges, but also the removal of state judges whenever the public 
disagrees with an opinion, must be stopped to maintain judicial integrity of the 
judiciary.270 
C. Unregulated Recall Will Lead To Future Misuse of Recall 
“Should an angry group be able to throw out a sitting judge on the basis of 
one unpopular verdict?”271 That would boast a “mob justice” mantra.272 Although 
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elections and recalls reflect the American mantra—that “all citizens have the 
right to question their elected officials and challenge them openly,”273 recalling a 
judge is different from recalling an elected official in the political branch.274 A 
judge represents enforcement of the law.275 Thus, judges are not representative of 
any specific constituent.276 If judges are successfully recalled for reasons based 
on emotion and anger, reasons that have nothing to do with the lawfulness of the 
judge’s decision, the public may develop the perception that judicial recall is an 
appropriate and effective solution to every single unpopular decision or criminal 
sentence.277 
Like impeachment, review boards, and commissions that are already in place, 
the recall process should be based on concrete reasons of actual judicial 
misconduct or misfeasance.278 When there is a successful recall based only on 
emotion and political differences, recall is understood as an easier way to get a 
judge out of office, simply for not liking the judge in a convenient manner.279 
Not all electoral processes such as recall help reinforce judicial 
accountability or help facilitate “self-government by empowering the people to 
hold accountable these important officials.”280 The “Axiom of 80” provides that 
while roughly 80% of the public prefers to elect judges, roughly 80% of the 
public do not vote in judicial elections, cannot identify judicial candidates, and 
believe that judicial decisions are influenced by campaign contributions.281 Thus, 
these electoral processes—elections and recall—will likely continue to persist 
despite the public not voting, not knowing the candidates, and believing that 
judges make rulings based on their campaign contributions.282 
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Constituents understand very little when it comes to elections.283 “If we 
consider the realities of public information about judges, it is likely that most 
ballots cast in judicial elections are based only on the most fragmentary 
knowledge.”284 When it comes to evaluating a judge on a recall ballot, the 
electorate is missing information—essential information about whether the judge 
was acting appropriately.285 “Voters seldom have well-conceptualized positions 
on the issues; they often suffer from an acute inattentiveness to and ignorance of 
public affairs, including the candidates on the ballot.”286 
Only a well-informed electorate—an electorate that that has an understanding 
of how the law is applied, how the rule of law operates, and when judicial 
decisions are within the law—should have the power to remove a judge.287 Since 
it is extremely difficult to educate everyone as to how judicial decisions are 
made, recalling a judge when the reason is not reviewable places a judge who 
makes a decision within the law at the mercy of an ill-advised and uninformed 
electorate.288 
As the late Justice Antonin Scalia warned, “[B]e slow to judge judges unless 
you know what they are working with.”289 With recall, the citizens are usurping 
the role of the judiciary as they review decisions as if they were decision makers 
without knowledge of the facts and law governing the original decision.290 Doing 
so would give voters a chance to use unregulated recall more frequently and 
dangerously, which significantly threatens the rule of law and judicial 
independence in California.291 Thus, when considering how California has 
existing methods of judicial accountability—judicial elections, the Commission 
on Judicial Performance, and impeachment processes—recall is unnecessary for 
judicial accountability, and thus should end as an option for judicial 
accountability.292 
VII. CONCLUSION 
California’s “unregulated” judicial recall as an additional method of judicial 
accountability crosses the threshold of what is necessary to ensure judicial 
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accountability in the state’s justice system.293 California ensures accountability in 
a direct way by allowing citizens to vote for their judges.294 California also 
ensures judicial accountability through a myriad of other manners: an 
impeachment process and review by the California Commission on Judicial 
Conduct.295 More traditional ways of accountability include the statutory rights to 
appeal and the important role of judicial opinion writing in American 
jurisprudence.296 Citizens can also seek to hold judges accountable by pushing for 
more laws judges must follow through the traditional democratic process.297 
Unregulated recall—when the reason for recall is non-reviewable for 
substance—invites inevitable, adverse consequences.298 Recall leads to a 
dangerous increase in harsher sentences in criminal cases,299 an increase in the 
political spending by public interest groups,300 and the risk that uneducated 
citizens will misuse the judicial recall process.301 An unregulated recall process, 
where citizens can base their reasons for judicial recall on anything, is not only 
excessive for the state’s goal of judicial accountability, but is the proverbial fat, 
menacing crocodile that needs to be dragged out of the judge’s bathtub in order 
to preserve judicial independence in California.302 
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